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in this case. 
I would therefore affirm 
A. Xo. 31472. Jn Bank. 
:M:. F'. KE:\IPI<JH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY Co-
partnership), Plaintiff and v. 'I' HE CITY 
OF I;OS ANGELES et 1\L P. KEJVIPEit 
[1] Municipal Corporations-Contracts-Bids.--Onee and 
declared, a construction hid on a public 
is in the nature of an inevocable option, 
a contract of whieh the cannot be dPpriv<>d without 
its eonsent unless the for n•scission are satisfied. 
[2] Id.-Contracts-Bids-Mistake.-Actual noticP 
fore it attPmpted to accept a bid on a 
that the biddPr had made an t:nor in his 
is treated as pur· 
poses of rescission. CiY 
[3] Cancellation-Mistake.-RPlief from mistaken bids is eon· 
allowed where om; party knows or has reason to know 




Cal.Jur. 1006; 38 Am.Jur. 
basis bill in to rescind con-
nnd remedie;; bidder of 
not entered into contract where bid was 
based on his own mistake of notes, 80 A.L.R. flS6; 107 A.L.R. 
1451. 4 Cal.Jur. 783: Am.Jur. 377. 
McK. Dig. References: Municipal Corporations, 
§ 356; § 32 §9; 13] Can-
cellation, § 361. 
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[10] 
struction company to on the 
a bid it submitted on a 
project, the will not be heard to 
be placed in statu quo because it will not 
an inequitable bargain. 
[11] Id.-Contracts-Bids-Rescission.-ln an action 
struction company to cancel a bid it submitted on a 
project, in which all of the other 
ments of rescission, including prompt notice upon the 
of a clerical error, have been met, no offer of restoration was 
necessary where the company received nothing of value which 
it could restore. (Civ. Code,§ 3407.) 
[12] Id.-Contracts-Bids-Mistake-Errors of Judgment Distin-
guished.-In an action hy a construction company to 
on the ground of a clerical mistake, a hid it submitted on a 
municipal public improvement project, a statement in the in-
vitation and official hid form that bidders "will not be released 
on account of errors" will be given effect by interpreting it as 
relating to errors of judgment as distinguished from clerical 
mistakes. 
[13] Cancellation-Mistake.-There is no distinction between pub-
lic and private contracts with regard to the right of equitable 
relief by way of rescission for mistake. (See Civ. Code, § 1635.) 
[14] Municipal Corporations-Contracts-Bids-Forfeiture.--The 
language of a city charter, providing that the bid bond of a 
successful bidder is forfeited on his failure to enter into the 
contract awarded him, cannot be construed as requiring for-
feiture in situation,; where the bidder has a legal excuse for 
refusing to enter into the formal written contract. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Alfred L. Bartlett, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against a city to cancel a bid on public construction 
wo.rk. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Bourke Assistant 
City Attorney and James A. Doherty, Deputy City Attorney, 
for Appellants. 
Stephen Monteleone, John lVI. Martin and Frank L. Martin 
for Respondents. 
Gardiner Johnson and Thomas E. Stanton, Jr., as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
A. 699 
to cancel 
construction work and to 
'l'he 
J H48, the Board of Public Works pub-
bids for the construction of the general 
em for tlw Hyperion sewer project. Pursuant to 
charter, the notice provided that each bid must be 
a certified cheek or surety bond for an 
amount not less than 10 per cent of the sum of the bid "as 
a guarantee that the bidder will enter into the proposed con-
tract if it is awarded to him," and that the bond or check 
and the thereof ''will become the property of the 
of l1os Angeles, if the bidder fails or refuses to execute 
the required contract .... ""~ The charter provides: "After 
bids lwve been opened and declared, except with the consent 
of the officer, board or City Council having jurisdiction over 
the bidding, no bid shall be withdrawn, but the same shall 
be subject to acceptance by the city for a period of three 
months. . " ( § 38G (d).) 'J'he notice inviting bids reserved 
to the board the right to reject any and all bids, and both 
it and the official bid form stated that bidders "will not be 
released on account of errors." 
Respondent company learned of the invitation for bids 
on August 17 and immediately began to prepare its proposal. 
Over a thousand different items were involved in the esti-
mates. The actual computations were performed by three 
men, each of whom ealculated the costs of different parts of 
the ·work, and in order to complete their estimates, they all 
worked until 2 o'clock on the morning of the day the bids 
*Section 386 (d) of the charter of the city of Los Angeles provides 
in part that every bid shall be accompanied by a certified check or 
surety bond for an amount not less than ten per cent of the aggregate 
sum of the bid ''guaranteeing that the bidder will enter into the proposed 
contract if the sume be awarded to him." Section 386 (i) provides, "If 
the successful bidder fails to enter into the contract awarded him ... 
within ten days after the award, then the sum posted in cash or by 
certified check or guaranteed by the bid bond is forfeited to the city. Such 
forfeiture shall not preclude recovery of any Rum over and above the 
amount posted o~ guaranteed to which the city sustains damage by reason 




95 A.L.R. 1019] 
P .2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 
[5] Omission of the $301,769 item from the bid 
was, of course, a material mistake. The claims that the 
company is barred from relief because it was m 
preparing the estimates, but even if we assume that 
was due to some carelessness, it does not follow 
company is without Civil Code section 
defines mistake of fact for which relief may be 
scribes it as one not caused by "the of a legal 
on the part of the person making the mistake. [6] It has been 
recognized numerous times that not all carelessness constitutes 
a "neglect of legal duty" within the meaning of the section. 
(Los Angeles etc. Co. v. New Liverpool Salt 150 Cal. 
21, 28 [87 P. 1029] ; Mills v. Schulba, 95 Cal.App.2d 559, 565 
[213 P.2d 408] ; see Burt v. Los Angeles Olive GrowM·s Assn., 
175 Cal. 668, 675-676 [166 P. 993]; 3 Pomeroy's Equity 
,Jurisprudence § 856b.) On facts very similar to those in the 
present case, courts of other jurisdictions have stated that 
there was no culpable negligence and have granted relief 
from erroneous bids. (See Conduit & Foundation Corp. v. 
Atlantic City, 2 N .• T.Super. 433 f64 A.2d 382] ; Efchool Dist6ct 
of Efcottsbluff v. Olson Const. Co., 153 Neb. 451 r 45 N.W.2d 
164]; Board of Regents of Murray Eftate Normal Sch. v. Cole, 
209 Ky. 761 r273 S.W. 508]; Geremia v. Bo~tarslcy, 107 Conn. 
387 [140 A. 749]; Barlow v. Jones, (N.,J.) 87 A. 649; W. F. 
Martens & Co. v. City of Syracuse, 183 App.Div. 622 f171 
N.Y.Supp. 871 ; R. 0. Bromagin & Co. v. Citu of Bloomington, 
234 Ill. 114 [84 N.E. 7001; Board of Rchool Com'rs v. Bender, 
36 Ind.App. 164 f72 N.E. 1541; Moffett, Hodrtkins & Clarke 
Co. v. Rochester, 178 U.S. 373 f20 S.Ct. 957, 44 L.Ed. 11081: 
see 59 A.I.J.R. at 818-824; cf. Steinmeyer v. Schrowpvel. 226 
Ill. 9 r8o N.E. 564, 117 Am.St.Rep. 224, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 1141.) 
[7] The type of error here involved is one which will some-
times occur in the conduct of reasonable and cautious business-
men, and, under all the circumstances, we cannot say as a 
matter of law that it constituted a neglect of legal duty such 
as would bar the right to equitable relief. 
[81 The evidence clearly supports the conclusion that it 
would be unconscionable to hold the company to its bid at 
the mistaken figure. The city had knowledge before the bid 
was accepted that the company had made a clerical rrror 
which resulted in the omission of an item amounting to nearly 
one third of the amount intended to be bid, and, under all the 
CITY 01!' L. A. 703 
it appears that it would be and unfair 
to take advantage of the company's mistake. 
'l'here is no reason for relief on the ground 
that the cannot be restored to status quo. It had ample 
which to award the contract without the 
awarded to the next lowest and 
vYill not be heard to that it cannot be placed 
because it -wm not have the benefit of an in-
(Union &; People's Nat. Bank v. Anderson-
256 lVIich. 674 l240 N.W. 19, 80 A.L.R. 584]; 
School District Scottsbluff v. Olson Canst. 153 Neb. 
431 N.W.2d 164, 166-167]; see 59 A.L.R. at p. 825.) 
[11] the company gave notice promptly upon dis-
the facts entitling it to rescind, and no offer of 
restoration was necessary because it had received nothing of 
value which it could restore. (See Rosemead Co. v. Shipley 
207 CaL 414, 420-422 [278 P. 1038].) We are satisfied 
that all the requirements for rescission have been met. 
[12] The city nevertheless contends that the company is 
precluded from relief because of the statement in the invita-
tion and in the official bid form that bidders "will not be 
released on account of errors,'' and that this language re-
quired all contractors to warrant the accuracy of their bids 
and to waive all rights to seek relief for clerical mistake. 
There is a difference between mere mechanical or clerical 
errors made in tabulating or transcribing figures and errors 
of judgment, as, for example, underestimating the cost of 
labor or materials. The distinction between the two types of 
error is recognized in the cases allowing rescission and in 
the procedures provid~d by the state and federal governments 
for relieving contractors from mistakes in bids on public 
work. (See School District of Scottsbluff v. Olson Const. Co., 
153 Neb. 451 [ 45 N.W.2d 164, 166]; Cal. Gov. Code, § 14352; 
Federal Armed Services Procurement Regulation, 32 O.F.R. 
401; Decisions B-91381, 29 Comp. Gen. 393.) Generally, 
relief is refused for error in judgment and allowed only for 
clerical or mathematical mistakes. (See cases cited in 59 
.A.L.R. 827-830 and 80 A.L.R. 586.) Where a person is 
denied relief because of an error in judgment, the agreement 
which is enforced is the one he intended to make, whereas if 
he is denied relief from a clerical error, he is forced to 
perform an agreement he had no intention of making. The 
statement in the bid form in the present case can be given 




[14] There is no merit in the contention that, even 
the company is entitled to cancellation of the bid 
and is not liable for breach of the bid bond should 
nevertheless be enforced because the company failed to enter 
into a written contract. It is that forfeiture of the 
bond is provided for charter and that equity cannot re-
lieve from a statutory forfeiture. vVe do not agree however 
that the eharter should be construed as requiring for-
feiture of bid bonds in situations where the bidder has a legal 
excuse for refusing to enter into a formal written contract. 
Under such eireumstances the contingency which would give 
rise to a forfeiture has not occurred. (See Rainey v. Q1tigley, 
180 Ore. 554 78 P.2d 148, 152, 170 A.L.R 1149] .) In line 
with the general policy of construing against forfeiture 
wherever possible, decisions from other jurisdictions permit-
ting rescission of bids uniformly excuse the contractors from 
,.;imilar provisions relating to forfeiture of bid bonds or de-
posits. (See, for example, Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. 
Rochester, 178 U.S. 373 S.Ct. 44 L.Ed. 1108] ; Condu1:t 
<t': Fottndation Corp. v. Atlantic City, 2 N.J.Super. 433 [64 
A.2d 382, :383, ; Union & People's Nat. Bank v. Anderson-
Campbell Co., 256 Mich. 674 [240 N.W. 19, 80 A.L.R. 584] ; 
School Distr-ict of v. Olson Canst. Co., 153 Neb. 
4;)1 l45 N.W.2d 164]; Board of Regents of Mu1·ray State 
Normal Sch. v. Cole, 209 Ky. 761 [273 S.W. 508]; W. F. 
J[artens & Co. v. City Syn1euse, 183 App.Div. 622 [171 
:.J.Y.Supp. ; R. 0. Bromagin & Co. v. City of Bloomington, 
234 Ill. 114 184 N.E. 700]; Barlow v. Jones, (N .• J.) 87 A. 649: 
Board School Com't·s v. Bender, 36 Ind.App. 164 [72 N.E. 
1 ; see Irernp v. United 38 F'.Supp. 568, 573.) 'l'h<' 
eity places relianee on language in Palo & Dodini v. City of 
Oakland. 79 Cal.App.2d 750 [180 P.2d 764], where the 
opinion justified the enactment and enforcement of statutory 
provisions for forfeitnre of bid bonds. However, the court's 
remarks must be read in light of the fact that the bidder 
37 C.2d~23 
tll(' contnwt fo1· 
OYer in the 
the eontract rescinded 
of the work rather than 
offer-~the bid. Yet the action is 
its withdra \Yal~and 
etfect of the bid is the thing 
'' 'fhe company seeks 
to enforee 1·eseission of its of mistake.'' 
there is no eon tract foe the 
bidder refnsed to enter into it. 'l'he contract to be rescinded 
is a contraet to rnake a contraet to the that 
the itTC'Yoeable the of whieh is guaranteed 
tht> bid bond. At the time the bids the 
had no and J1ad no means that the 
bidder hal1 lllade a mistake. There is 
a naked 1milateral mistake which 
s(:issimL As it is sa icl : "A mistake of one 
fonm; tl1e basis on whieh he enters into ll transaction does not 
its('lf reJH1er the transaction voidable. . Con-
tracts. ~ Go:n If that rnle to 
tlwre i:o< ]('ft of the 
fPilme may avoid it 
mistake. The proof of whether or not he lws made 
bid at all. 
for 
as 
lwre. a bidder were allowed to himself to 
after the bids haYe be0n 
WO!tld de 'l'he 




. Sdwlz tTex. CiY. 4 S.W.2d IWL 
rule annom1eed in the abtwe cited has been thus stated: 
"\Vhen it is neeessar~· for a person to make caleulations or 
<•stimates. in ordN· to determine the sum which he will bid 
for an offered or to determine the cost to him of 
eon tract, or whether or not it will be ad van-
he must assume the risk of 
and eannot have 
mistake, if he reaehes a 
misunderstanding of 
error. Thus, 
for public work to take 
into consideration eertain features: of the work in making 
the rstimates on which his bid was based, does not eonstitnte 
a mistake whir·h will anthorizc a eonrt of equity to release 
him from tht> contraet created the of such bid. 
So. "·here makes an offer to erect a building for a 
errtain amonnt, and defendant accepts it, thPre is a con-
snmmated and binding· although the plaintiff, in 
adaing np the items of his estimates, makes a mistake of a 
Yery large fmm, provided drfendant is not in any way re-
sponsible for it. lmd a contract by which a company agrees 
to construct waterworks and furnish a municipal corporation 
and its inhabitants with an adequate supply of water, all to 
h<> taken from springs on eertain land, will not be canceled 
heeansr tl1e springs prove inadequate, the mistake as 
to tlwir capacity been no more the fault of the onr 
party than of the other. So a contractor who agrees to build 
a honse for a sum is not justified in to 
carry ont his beeause of the error of a sub-
words 
which error induced the sub-
the work.'' on Rescis-
the bidder here was advised 
letters in the invitation for bids and 
of any mistakes was to be 
the bidder. Pertinent rules are stated: " '"Where the 
treat upon the basi!> that the fact is doubtful, and the 
eaeh is to encounter is taken into consideration 
m assented the contract will be valid, 
not withstanding any mistake of one of the ' 'l'he rule 
is elaborated in 2 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, section 
quoted in Colton 82 Cal. 388, 389 [23 
P. 16, 16 Am.St.Hep. . 'rhe cases put by Mr. Pomeroy 
presuppos,~ 'au based upon uncertain or con-
tingent events of doubtful claims 
arising from them, and where have knowingly entered 
into a contract or transaction-one in which they 
intentionally speculated as to the result-and there is in either 
ea::;t~ an absence of bad faith, violation of confidence, mis-
representation or concealment or other inequitable conduct.' 
'In such classes of agreements and transactions,' says the 
learned author, 'the parties are supposed to calculate the 
ehanees, and they certainly assume the risks, breach of con-
fidenee, misrepresentation, eulpable concealment, or other like 
conduct amounting to actual or constructive fraud.' Defend-
ant still further relies upon the rule as stated in Ashcorn v. 
Smith. 2 Pen. & vV. (Pa.! 211, [21 Am.Dec. 437], where 
acreage was t>stimated. The court said: 'Equity will indeed 
relieve against a plain mistake, as well as against misrepre-
sentation and fraud. But can mistake be alleged in a matter 
which was considered doubtful, and treated accordingly? 
Where each of the is content to take the risk of its 
turning out in a particular way, chancery will certainly not 
l'elieve against the event.' " (Italics added.) (Taber v. 
P£edrnont Heights Bldg. 25 Cal.App. 222, 227 (143 P. 
:n 91 ; see, also, Colton v. 82 Cal. 351, 388 [23 P. 16. 
16 Am.St.Rep. 
The majority opinion cites School Dist. of Scottsbluff v. 
Olson Canst. 153 Neb. 451 r 45 N.W.2d 1641, but there 
m 
uncertain factors 
the amount of materials and labor 
in their the 
tllH1 
will t!w 
if l1c: does not do so. The papers 
tho birt(la will not be exensed for any 
'Jeyr•rlheh•ss, the holds 
of thosp eircnmstances mean The clis.astrou" 
of in the Petrovich easf: on pnblie 
for a rehea 
.T., YOtPc! for a 
fades into 
